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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

CHOICE OF LAW IN THE MISSOURI COURTS: HOW HAVE THE
MISSOURI COURTS EMPLOYED THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
OF CONFLICTS TO TORTIOUS AND CONTRACTUAL ISSUES?

RICHARD J. ANSSON, JR.*

I. INTRODUCTION
The jurisprudence of conflicts of law1 yields a legal discipline fraught with
uncertainty and instability.2 Despite over fifty years of scholarly commentary
and analysis, courts have been unable to develop practical mechanisms to
resolve conflicts of law problems leading many to characterize this discipline
of law as a “reign of chaos”3 and a “judicial nightmare.”4 Indeed, even
William Prosser, the legendary torts scholar, once stated that the “realm of the
conflict of laws is a dismal swamp, filled with quaking quagmires, and
inhabited by learned but eccentric professors who theorize about mysterious
matters in strange incomprehensible jargon. The ordinary court, or lawyer, is
quite lost when engulfed and entangled in it.”5

* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Missouri at Kansas City. BA, 1994, University of
Oklahoma; JD 1997, University of Oklahoma College of Law; L.L.M., 1998, University of
Missouri at Kansas City School of Law.
1. The discipline of “conflicts of laws” covers a wide range of issues including choice of
substantive law, jurisdictional and forum selection questions, and full faith and credit problems.
Choice-of-law, in contrast, is ordinarily considered to be a subset of conflicts of laws. Choice-oflaw issues revolve around questions concerning which jurisdiction’s law should be applied by a
particular state to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties resulting from an occurrence
involving foreign elements. These rules are commonly referred to as choice-of-law rules, because
they do not themselves determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, but rather guide decision
as to which local law rule will be applied to determine these rights and duties. See infra note 6
and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and
Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466 (1991). Kramer argued, after evaluating the conflicts
decisions authored in 1990, that conflicts analysis was “unsophisticated, unthoughtful, and often
unreasoned.” Id.
3. In re Paris Air Crash of Mar. 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732, 739 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
4. Forsythia v. Cesna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975).
5. William L. Prosser, Interstate Publication, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1952-53).
487
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Perhaps much of the bewilderment is attributable to the fact that there are
approximately seven separate choice of law theories.6 Further aggravating this
problem is the fact that many of these theoretical approaches have arisen from
differing theoretical foundations.7 Finally, compounding this problem is the
fact that six of the seven theoretical approaches have arisen only over the last
forty-five years.8
Because of these difficulties, conflicts of law issues have probably caused
more trepidation and mystification among the bench and bar than any other
discipline.9 Not surprisingly, most courts have been unable to adeptly apply

6. The seven main approaches used to examine choice of law problems include: 1) The
First Restatement of Conflicts; 2) the significant contacts approach, 3) interest analysis; 4) the
Second Restatement of Conflicts; 5) ex for; 6) better law; and 7) New York Approach. For the
latest review of which jurisdictions apply what approaches in torts and contracts, see SYMEON C.
SYMEONIDES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 286-88
(1998). See also Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996: Tenth
Annual Survey, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 447 (1997) This article details changes in conflicts
approaches employed by the various jurisdictions in 1996. For a comprehensive list of articles
detailing changes in conflicts, see Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996,
supra at 448 n.1.
Within this set of jurisdictions, a handful of jurisdicitons have adopted specific tests to
resolve “true conflicts.” True conflicts result when two states each have a policy interest in
seeing that their laws are followed. For an example of a true conflicts case, see, e.g., Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). The above mentioned approaches address true conflicts, but
several jurisdictions have adopted specific tests to address this issue. The three main approaches
used to examine true conflicts choice of law problems include: 1) comparative impairment, 2)
overt weighing of interest, and 3) principled territorialism. For more on comparative impairment,
see Herma Hill Kay, The Use of Comparative Impairment to Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1980). The overt weighing of
interest test is used in Wisconsin. For more on Wisconsin choice of law, see Shirley A. Wiegand,
Officious Intermeddling, Interloping Chauvinism, Restatement (Second), and Leflar: Wisconsin’s
Choice of Law Melting Pot, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 761 (1998). For more on principled territorialism,
see Aaron D. Tweaks, Enlightened Territorialism and Professor Caverns - The Pennsylvania
Method, 9 DU. L. REV. 373 (1971); James E. Westbrook, A Survey and Evaluation of Competing
Choice-of-Law Methodologies: The Case for Eclecticism, 40 MO. L. REV. 407, 460 (1975).
7. See, e.g., Stuart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA.
L. REV. 949, 950 (1994) (“Choice of law theorists differ not only about the method but also about
the very foundations of choice of law theory.”). See also James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict of
Laws: The New Approach to Choice of Laws: Justice in Search of Certainty, Part Two, 94 W.
VA. L. REV. 73, 90 (1991) (McLaughlin, explaining the different modern approaches to choiceof-law issues, noted that some scholars are “positivists, some realists, some neo-naturalists.
Further, overlapping those general categories are formalist/conceptualist and instrumentalist/
functionalists.”).
8. See, e.g., Wiegand, supra note 6, at 763-67 (discussing the various methodologies that
have arisen over the last forty-five years).
9. No one article or case can accurately describe or explain this trepidation and
mystification, but for cases mentioning the inability to comprehend, see supra notes 3-5 and
accompanying text. For articles describing this trepidation, see supra note 6 and accompanying
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various modern choice of law theories set forth by conflicts scholars.10
Furthermore, when applying a particular test, most courts not only fail to
identify which test they are using but also fail to distinguish their test from
others.11 These two factors have led to decisions that are often undeniably, if
not wildly, inconsistent.12 This uncertainty has been complicated by the fact
that published conflicts decisions are quite rare - even though conflicts cases
arise at the trial level fairly often.13 In other states, matters have been further
complicated by the fact that state supreme courts have failed to address the
issue.14 Thus, with little written precedent, judges have been left to struggle
with a handful of irreconcilable and sometimes incomprehensive precedents.15
As a result, it is no small wonder that many judges have been apprehensive
when confronted with choice of law cases on their dockets.
Missouri courts have fared much better than most over the last thirty-five
years. However, many inconsistencies remain.16 This article reviews how the
Missouri courts have employed conflicts analysis with regard to tortious17 and
contractual issues,18 and recommends a formula for Missouri courts to use
when reviewing conflict issues. These recommendations will, at the very least,
guarantee a higher level of consistency, uniformity, and certainty in conflicts
cases.19 Such guarantees are important in conflicts cases because a conflicts
decision will likely determine the success or failure of a lawsuit. As a result, it

text. For articles discussing the conflicts landscape, see Symeonides, Choice of Law in American
Courts in 1996, supra note 6, at 448 n.1.
10. Again, no one article can adequately highlight this difficulty. For articles discussing
conflicts decisions, see Symeonides, Choice of Law in American Courts in 1996, supra note 6, at
448 n.1.
11. See, e.g., Symeon C. Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Conflicts
Restatement: A Mixed Blessing, 56 MD. L. REV. 1248, 1261 (1997) (Symeonides, for example,
states that “the precedents from North Carolina, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Wyoming are
susceptible to different interpretations and thus raise legitimate doubts as to whether these states
properly belong in the Restatement (Second) column.”).
12. See, e.g., id. Symeonides stated that “In some choice of law cases, the existing
precedents are equivocal or even irreconcilable.” Id.
13. See, e.g., Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1996, supra note 6, at
448 n.2 (finding that there were a little over 1,000 conflicts cases decided in 1996). In Missouri,
there have been approximately fifty noteworthy conflicts cases decided over the last thirty-five
years. See infra Sections III and IV.
14. See, e.g., Symeonides, The Judicial Acceptance of the Second Restatement: A Mixed
Blessing, supra note 11, at 1261. For example, Symeonides noted that the supreme courts of
Illinois and Missouri have not decided a conflicts contract opinion after having adopted the
Second Restatement approach for tortuous issues. Id.
15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Parts III and IV.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Parts III, IV, V.
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is imperative that judges pen decisions which are discernible and reflective of a
core set of principles specifically employed to decide conflicts cases.
This article examines how Missouri courts have employed conflicts
analysis to tortious and contractual issues. Part II reviews the dominant choice
of law theories. Part III examines and critiques tortious decisions authored by
Missouri courts. Part IV discusses and analyzes contractual decisions. Finally,
Part V concludes with a simple proposal designed to bring certainty and order
to tortious and contractual choice-of-law litigation brought in Missouri.
II. CHOICE-OF-LAW JURISPRUDENCE: A BRIEF HISTORY
In the United States, the First Restatement on Conflicts of Law represented
the first organized collection of theories on conflicts of laws.20 The First
Restatement, which was authored by Joseph Beale and published in 1934,
relied upon the concept of territoriality and the vested rights philosophies of
early twentieth century theorists.21 Beale’s approach held that the rights of
parties vested in the place where they were created.22 Beale’s First
Restatement contained inflexible rules providing that the law of the vesting
state must be applied, regardless of the jurisdiction where the claim was filed.23
In tortious claims, the First Restatement directed courts to apply the law of the
jurisdiction where the injury occurred.24 For contractual claims, the First
Restatement instructed courts to apply either the law of the jurisdiction where
the contract was made or where the contract was to be performed.25 Under this
approach, parties were not allowed to choose which jurisdiction could control
contractual provisions.26
Even at the height of its popularity, the First Restatement was fiercely
criticized for elevating the principles of predictability and certainty over the
principle of fairness.27 To avoid the harsh results often obtained from the
application of the First Restatement, many courts developed a vast array of
escape devices.28 Nevertheless, even with escape devices in place, many still
20. For a discussion of conflicts law prior to the First Restatement, see Elliott E. Cheatham,
American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility, 58 HARV. L. REV. 361, 365-67
(1945).
21. See, e.g., James Audley McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The Choice of Law Lex Loci
Doctrine, The Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 957, 960-61
(1991).
22. Id. For a historical account and critique of Professor Beale’s theory, see Perry Dane,
Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987).
23. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 960-61.
24. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 377 (1934).
25. Id. §§ 332 & 358.
26. Id. § 62.
27. See infra note 28.
28. The most prevalent escape devices include topics such as characterization, renvoi,
substance/procedure distinction, and public policy. For a good discussion of these issues, see
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condemned the First Restatement.29
For example, Professor Cavers
condemned the First Restatement approach as early as 1933, arguing that if
courts found that an unfair judgment would result, many courts would ignore
the principles set forth in the First Restatement.30 Despite the critics, however,
the rules of the First Restatement sustained almost unanimous acceptance for
close to thirty years.
After this thirty-year period, a revolution occurred in conflicts of laws
thinking.31 Beginning in 1954 with Auten v. Auten,32 jurisdictions began to
discard the First Restatement in favor of new methods promoting fairness by
evaluating policy issues underlying conflicts claims. In Auten, Justice Fuld
determined that New York would adopt the center of gravity test, which looked
not to the place of making nor the place of performance nor the place of the
wrong, but rather looked to the law of the place which had “the most
significant contacts with the matter in dispute.”33 Justice Fuld maintained that
under this approach courts would be able to focus on the relative interests
involved, thereby enabling a court to apply the policy of the jurisdiction with
the most significant contacts to the case.34
During the late 1950s, Brainerd Currie developed another method for
evaluating conflict of laws problems known as governmental interest
analysis.35 Under Currie’s approach, a court should assess the policy interests
WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 151-61
(1996).
29. Id.
30. David F. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARV. L. REV. 173
(1933). Two other early writers criticized the vested rights approach prior to Professor Cavers
but none of them proffered a new approach. See Walter W. Cook, The Jurisdiction of Sovereign
States and the Conflict of Laws, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 368 (1931) (arguing that the territorialist
system may be in accord with the realities of modern political and legal organization but is
nonetheless high ambiguous); Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1923-24) (arguing that the vested rights theory is circular); Ernest G.
Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1923-24)
(arguing general common law principles may not be derived from notions of territoriality); Ernest
G. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflicts of Laws, 30 YALE L.J. 565, 565
(1920-21) (“There is no topic in the conflict of laws in regard to which there is greater uncertainty
than that of contracts. In this country there is no agreement even regarding the fundamental
principles that should govern.”).
31. For articles discussing the choice-of law revolution, see Patrick J. Borchers, The Choiceof-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357 (1992); Herma Hill Kay,
Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REV. 521 (1983); and Harold
L. Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 722 (1983).
32. 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
33. Id. at 101-02.
34. Id.
35. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Choice-of-Law Method, 25
U. CHI. L. REV. 227, 246-47 (1958); see also Brainerd Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives
in the Conflicts of Laws 1959 DUKE L.J. 171 (1959).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

492

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:487

of each affected jurisdiction in an effort to determine whose laws should be
applied.36 If only one jurisdiction has an interest, then a false conflict exists,
and the court should apply the law of the interested jurisdiction.37 If, however,
more than one jurisdiction has an interest, then the “sensible and clearly
constitutional thing for any court to do . . . is to apply its own law.”38 Later,
Professor Currie advocated that before applying forum law in a true conflicts
case, courts should try to reevaluate their policies when confronted with a true
conflict.39
Shortly after publication of Currie’s interest analysis, Justice Fuld,
abandoning the significant contacts approach he had adopted in Auten, applied
interest analysis to a conflicts case in Babcock v. Jackson.40 In Babcock, he
evaluated the policy interests of the involved jurisdictions and found that a
false conflict existed.41 In so finding, Justice Fuld decided to apply the law of
the interested jurisdiction.42
Other conflicts theories emerged as part of the conflicts revolution. For
instance, in the 1960s, Professor Robert Leflar championed a theory known as
the better law doctrine.43 This doctrine espoused a five-step test which in
effect directed courts to apply the better law - usually meaning that the court
would apply the law of the forum.44 Also, in the 1960s, Professor Albert

36. Currie, Married Women’s Contracts, supra note 35, at 246-47.
37. See generally Comment, Peter K. Westen False Conflicts, 55 CAL. L. REV. 74 (1967).
See also Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, Inc., 534 A.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
38. Currie, Married Women’s Contracts, supra note 35, at 261. See also Lilienthal v.
Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964). Currie also provided that if no state has an interest that state
should apply its own law. This final category has been denoted by Currie as the unprovided-for
case. See Brainerd Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754
(1963).
39. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, supra note 38, at 757. In so doing, Currie noted
that a court may turn an “apparent true conflict” into a false conflict. For a case illustrating
Currie’s reevaluation approach, see, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961).
40. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). Babcock is a legendary conflicts decision. For a detailed
discussion of Babcock, see Friedrich K. Juenger, Babcock v. Jackson Revisited: Judge Fuld’s
Contribution to American Conflicts Law, 56 ALB. L. REV. 727 (1993); Patrick J. Borchers,
Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 ALB. L. REV. 883 (1993). Babcock is not expressly an interest analysis
case but has been claimed to be one by interest analysis proponents.
41. Babcock, 191 N.E.2d at 284.
42. Id. at 284-85.
43. Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267, 295-304 (1966); Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966).
44. The five considerations that need to be addressed are: 1) predictability of result; 2)
maintenance of interstate and international order; 3) simplification of the judicial task; 4)
advancement of the forum’s governmental interests; and 5) the better rule of law. For a case
employing this approach, see Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973).
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Ehrenzweig developed the lex fori doctrine.45 This doctrine stated that courts
are to look to true rules, and if no true rules exist, then the court is to apply its
own law.46
Finally, in 1971, the Second Restatement of Conflicts was completed, and
it combined the significant contacts approach of Auten with the interest
analysis approach of Babcock. Section 6, which incorporates the Babcock
interest analysis approach into the Second Restatement, lists seven factors to
be analyzed in all substantive areas. Under section 6, the seven factors
include: a) the needs of the interstate and international systems; b) the relevant
policies of the forum; c) the relevant policies of interested states and the
relative interest of those states in the determination of a particular issue; (d) the
protection of justified expectations; (e) the basic policies underlying the
particular field of law; (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.47 When
applying this section, courts are free to give varied weight to particular
factors;48 however, courts that have wanted to employ Babcock-type interest
analysis have focused on sections (b), (c) and (e).49
45. See generally Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Proper Law in a Proper Forum: A Restatement
of the “Lex Fori Approach,” 18 OKLA. L. REV. 340 (1965).
46. RICHMAN, supra note 28, at 232-33. Under Ehrenzweig’s approach, the following
principles were considered true rules “in family law, courts adopt rules which uphold a
marriage . . . and legitimacy . . .; contract questions are controlled by party autonomy if the
parties have chosen a law and, if not, by a ‘validating law’ that would uphold the contract; the
‘lex situs’ controls most land transactions as well as successions to immovables.” Id.
In torts, Ehrenzweig did not really identify any true rules. Id. To date, the courts of only
three states have adopted this approach, and these courts - Nevada, Michigan, and Kentucky have done so specifically in the field of torts. SYMEONIDES, CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL, supra note 6, at 286-88. The Nevada Supreme Court adopted
this approach in Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc., 921 P.2d 933 (Nev. 1996). Under this approach,
the Motenko Court stated that “the law of the forum . . . governs in a tort case, unless another state
has an overwhelming interest.” Id. at 935. The court determined that another state would have an
overwhelming interest in the matter if two or more of the following contacts occurred in said
state: (a) it is the place where the conduct giving rise to the injury occurred; (b) it is the place
where the injury is suffered; (c) it is the place where the parties have their common domicile,
residence, nationality, place of incorporation, or place of business; and (d) it is the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT].
48. Id. cmt. c. Specifically, section c stated that “[v]arying weight will be given to a
particular factor, or to a group of factors, in different areas of choice of law.” Id.
49. See, e.g., O’Connor v. O’Connor, 510 A.2d 13 (Conn. 1986) (applying sections (b) (c)
and (e) in an effort to weigh each jurisdiction’s relative policy interests). See also Bryant v.
Silverman, 703 P.2d 1190 (Ariz. 1985) (discussing all seven factors in section 6 but primarily
focusing on each jurisdiction’s relative policy interest).
It is important to remember that courts using Babcock-type interest analysis have done so
to shed light on false conflicts. When a true conflict arises, the pure interest analysis of Professor
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Other Second Restatement sections address particular subject areas - such
as torts and contracts - and specify a presumptive rule along with a list of
factors that are to be considered when evaluating said subject matter area.50
This approach utilizes a multi-factored test patterned, in part, after the
significant contacts approach of Auten.51 For instance, when determining a
tortious issue, it is presumed that the law of the place of injury will control
“unless, with respect to some particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in section six.”52 In torts,
the relevant factors to be considered in connection with the factors listed in
section six are: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicile, residence, nationality,
place of incorporation and place of the parties, and (d) the place where the
relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.53
Likewise, in contracts, if the parties have not designated a choice-of-law to
govern their dispute,54 the court is instructed to determine if the contract is
covered by a series of presumptive references.55 The presumptive provisions
detail rules for specific contracts,56 contractual issues,57 and contractual
situations.58 If the contract does not fall within one of the presumptive
provisions, then the court is directed to apply the most significant contacts test
to determine which jurisdiction has the most significant relationship to the
issue. In contracts, the relevant factors to be considered in connection with
section six are: (a) the place of contracting, (b) the place of negotiation of the

Currie, which directs a court to apply forum law, has not been embraced by the Second
Restatement. Instead, when a true conflict arises, a court must determine which jurisdiction’s law
applies in accordance with the other applicable factors of the Second Restatement. See McBride
v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 625 A.2d 279 (Del. Super. 1993), aff’d, 645 A.2d 568 (Del.
1994) (court finding true conflict under section 6 but applying and determining outcome of
litigation based on application of section 145. For a discussion of section 145, see infra note 54
and accompanying text.).
50. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, § 145 (torts) and § 188 (contracts).
51. See Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REV. 521, 552-62 (1983).
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47 § note 146.
53. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 145(2).
54. See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
55. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, §§ 189-212.
56. For instance, the Restatement provides for specific rules with regard to land contracts,
sale of chattels, insurance contracts, contracts of surety, contracts for repayment of money lent,
transportation contracts, and usurious contracts. Id. §§ 189-198.
57. For example, the Restatement provides for specific rules with regard to capacity,
contractual formalities, consideration, fraud, duress, mistake, assignment, and discharge. Id. §§
199-212.
58. For example, under the Restatement, if the place of negotiation and performance are the
same, then the law of that jurisdiction will be applied. Id. § 188(3). Additionally, if the
performance is illegal in the place of performance, the contract will not be enforced. Id. § 202(2).
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contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the location of the subject matter of
the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation
and place of business of the parties.59
In the field of contracts, the Second Restatement partially embraces the
concept of party choice and permits parties to specify the applicable governing
law as to any item that could validly be contained in a contract clause.60 Under
the Second Restatement, courts are directed to respect the parties’ choice-oflaw even if the parties could not have resolved the issue with an explicit
contractual provision, unless one of the following applies: (1) the chosen state
has no substantial relationship to the parties and there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties’ choice, or (2) the application of the law of the chosen
state is contrary to a fundamental policy of the state that has a materially
greater interest in the transaction, and under the Second Restatement would be
the state whose law would apply in the absence of party choice.61 Despite the
complexity of this approach, modern courts employ this doctrine and normally
uphold the parties’ plenary choice-of-law.62
Numerous states, including Missouri,63 now employ the Second
Restatement approach; application of this approach has been wildly
inconsistent, however, and has been roundly criticized by scholars.64 Indeed,
one scholar explained:
[T]he Second Restatement is something of an unsatisfactory document when
viewed as a whole. Part of the problem is the curious combination of broad
and open-ended policy considerations with the quite specific jurisdictionselecting presumptions. Many courts apparently treat the presumptions as
virtual mandates; others almost completely ignore them. Part of the problem is
that the Restatement does not really illuminate the interplay between policy
and presumptions; another difficulty is that the policy considerations
themselves appear amorphous.65

These respective problems have allowed courts to seemingly dispense with
justice as they have deemed appropriate. Not surprisingly, this situation has
presented a mind-boggling lack of uniformity in case law, and unfortunately,
59. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 188.
60. Id. § 187.
61. Id.
62. For cases upholding contractual choice-of-law agreements, see, e.g., Tele-Save
Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distrib. Co., 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987); Nedlloyd Lines
B.V. v. Super. Ct., 834 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1992). For cases voiding contractual choice of law
agreements, see, e.g., DeSantis v. Wackenhut, 793 S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1990); Instructional Sys.,
Inc. v. Computer Curriculum Corp., 614 A.2d 124 (N.J. 1992).
63. See infra Parts III, IV.
64. RICHMAN, supra note 29, at 211 (citing Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American
Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465 1991) (lamenting that
decisions using the Second Restatement are noticeably worse than other jurisdictions).
65. Id.
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Missouri courts have not faired any better when applying the Second
Restatement to tortious and contractual conflicts issues.
III CHOICE-OF-LAW, TORTS, AND THE MISSOURI COURTS
A.

The Missouri Supreme Court
1.

False Conflicts

The Missouri Supreme Court expressly adopted the Second Restatement in
Kennedy v. Dixon.66 In Dixon, several Missouri residents were involved in a
car accident in Indiana.67 The plaintiff was traveling in an automobile that had
been licensed and garaged in Missouri.68 The driver of the vehicle was killed,
and the plaintiff was severely injured.69 The plaintiff subsequently sued the
driver’s estate for damages. In its defense, the estate argued that the Indiana
guest statute should be applied.70 After a detailed discussion of several choiceof-law decisions, and a review of Schwartz v. Schwartz,71 the Arizona case
which was the first to apply the Second Restatement to a tort case, the Missouri
Supreme Court announced that it, too, was adopting the Second Restatement.72
In applying the Second Restatement, the Missouri court first mentioned the
principles listed in section 145 and discussed the relevant facts in light of
section 145.73 The court stated:
Of course, the injuries occurred in Indiana and that is the place where the
negligent conduct occurred . . . . On the other hand, Missouri has a real
interest therein. The parties are residents of Missouri, made arrangements for
the trip in Missouri, and traveled in a car licensed and garaged in Missouri.
The whole relationship of the parties is centered in Missouri.74

After noting these facts, the Kennedy court, without anymore evaluation, stated
that it was clear that Missouri had the most significant relationship to the
involved parties.75
Next, in determining whether Indiana’s guest statute should be applied, the
Kennedy court evaluated the varying interests of Missouri and Indiana.76 In so
66. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1984).
67. Id. at 175.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 175-76. Indiana had a guest statute which was enacted to prevent insurance fraud.
Id. Missouri did not have a guest statute, and state policy encouraged compensating victims of
automobile accidents. Id. at 175, 185.
71. 447 P.2d 254 (Ariz. 1968).
72. Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 184-85.
73. Id. at 181.
74. Id. at 184-85.
75. Id. at 184.
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evaluating, the Missouri court discussed interest analysis in light of Babcock,77
not section six.78 The Kennedy court found that applying Indiana’s guest
statute would not serve any interest of that state because the parties involved
were Missouri parties.79 Therefore, the court found a false conflict, and
applied Missouri law since Missouri had a real interest in ensuring that its
citizens were compensated.80
In deciding Kennedy, the Missouri Supreme Court applied all four
principles of section 145 and applied the interest component principles of
section six. With regard to section 145, the court failed to label each
component in its discussion, but the court did discuss each component. Indeed,
the court stated: (a) the injury occurred in Indiana; (b) the conduct causing the
injury occurred in Indiana; (c) the domicile and residence of the parties was
Missouri; (d) the relationship was centered was Missouri.81 With respect to
section six, the court specifically addressed the interests of Missouri and
Indiana - subsections (b) relevant interest of forum and (c) relevant interest of
interested states.82 Therefore, in light of Kennedy’s analysis, Missouri courts,
when applying sections 145 and six to false conflicts cases, should analyze all
four factors listed in section 145 and the two interest analysis factors of section
six.
2.

True Conflicts

Since Kennedy, the Missouri Supreme Court has failed to address any
other false conflict claims. Indeed, the only other tort conflicts claims the
court has addressed have involved true conflicts.83 For instance, several years
after the Kennedy decision, the Missouri Supreme Court was faced with a true
conflict in Broglin v. Nangle.84 In this action, Broglin was killed when a St.

76. Id. at 184-85. The court noted that it must apply interest analysis because it did not
“engage in the mere counting of the number of contacts but must evaluate them in order to
determine what state has the most significant contacts.” Id. at 184.
77. Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 182-83. The Kennedy court also cited several other cases
employing interest analysis. Id. at 183-85.
78. For a detailed discussion of section 6, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
79. Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 185.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 184-85. For a discussion of section 145, see supra notes 73-75 and accompanying
text.
82. Id. at 184-85. For a discussion of section 6, see supra notes 76-80 and accompanying
text.
83. The Missouri Supreme Court specifically stated that it was addressing a true conflict in
Broglin v. Nangle, 510 S.W.2d 699, 703 (Mo. 1974). The court failed to state, however, that it
was addressing a true conflict in Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) and
Thompson v. Crawford, 833 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1992).
84. 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1974).
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Louis Southwestern Railway train struck his tractor-trailer.85 Broglin had lived
in Missouri but had regularly worked full time on a route between Missouri
and Texas.86 The railroad was a Missouri corporation with its principle place
of business in Texas.87 Broglin’s survivors brought a wrongful death suit in
Missouri.88 Under Missouri law, damages were limited to $50,000, while
under Texas law there were no limits on the amount of damages recoverable.89
The Broglin court first addressed all four section 145 principles. In
applying section 145, the court found: (a) Texas was the place of the accident;
(b) Texas was the place where the conduct giving rise to the accident occurred;
(c) Texas was the railroad’s principal place of operations while Missouri is the
widow’s residence, the descendant’s residence, and defendant’s place of
incorporation; and (d) there was no relationship between the parties prior to the
accident.90
Next, the court assessed the interest of each jurisdiction under the section 6
interest analysis factors and found that Texas had the most interest in having its
laws applied.91 The court explained:
Here we are confronted with a true conflict of both laws and state policies.
Defendant is incorporated in Missouri, and this state limits damages for
wrongful death to a maximum of $50,000, indicating a policy protecting
defendants from larger judgments; . . . but, defendant is also a Texas
domiciliary under the laws of that state. While the Texas statute is silent on
the measure of damages recoverable, the silence does indicate a state policy of
allowing unrestricted judgments for wrongful death . . . . Texas would
therefore seem to have some interest in the admonitory effect an unrestricted
judgment would have on a corporation domiciled in that state. More
importantly, Texas has a definite interest in having the full extent of its laws
control the activities within its borders of corporations which locate their
principle place of business in that state.92

The Broglin court echoed the Kennedy decision by applying the four
factors of section 145 and the two interest analysis factors of section six. The
decision departed from the tenets of the Second Restatement, however. Under
the Second Restatement, when a court is confronted with a true conflict, courts
should first apply the principles of section 145 and section six.93 Next, if the

85. Id. at 700.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 703.
88. Id. at 700.
89. Broglin, 510 S.W.2d at 700.
90. Id. at 702.
91. Id. at 703.
92. Id.
93. See, e.g., McBride v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 1993 WL 489487, at *2-*5 (Del.
Super. Ct.), aff’d, 645 A.2d 568 (Del. 1994).
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interest analysis prong of section six reveals a true conflict exists, then a court
should employ the law of the jurisdiction where the accident occurred.94
In Broglin, the Missouri Supreme Court applied Texas law - the law of the
jurisdiction where the accident occurred - but did so only after it reevaluated
each states’ respected interest. In so doing, the Broglin court determined that
Texas had a greater interest in the matter, and by evaluating which jurisdiction
had a greater interest, the Broglin court employed analysis more akin to pure
interest analysis.95 Indeed, under pure interest analysis, many courts will
reevaluate each states respective interests to determine which jurisdiction’s
laws should be applied.96 As a result of the analysis set forth in Broglin, the
Missouri Supreme Court’s analysis directed future courts to employ interest
analysis when evaluating which jurisdiction’s laws should be applied in a true
conflicts case.
Ten years after the Broglin decision, the Missouri Supreme Court, in
Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc.,97 failed to apply the interest analysis
subsections of section six to a true conflict.98 Instead, the Missouri Supreme
Court relied solely on section 145 in determining which jurisdiction’s laws
should be given effect.99
In Elmore, a worker brought suit against Owens-Illinois for illness caused
by the employer’s long-term exposure to asbestos in the workplace.100 The
worker lived in Kansas, but worked primarily for Missouri employers.101
Owens-Illinois argued that (1) Kansas law should be applied and (2) as such,
the employee would have to prove that Owens-Illinois knew or could have
known that the product was unreasonably dangerous.102 The employee wanted
Missouri law applied because under Missouri law, Owens-Illinois could be
held strictly liable.103

94. See, e.g., McBride, 1993 WL 489487 at *5.
95. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
96. See, e.g., People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1957); Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961). However, a number of courts that employ interest analysis
will not reevaluate each interested jurisdiction’s laws. Instead, these courts will choose to apply
the law of the forum when confronted with a true conflict. Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827
(Ky. App. 1972); Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
97. 673 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Mo. 1984).
98. The court even failed to mention that the conflict it was deciding was a true conflict.
99. Id. at 437.
100. Id. at 435.
101. See Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Mo. 1984). The employee
had also worked for employers from several different states. Id. at 437. The court found that “the
ratio between social security wages paid to him by Missouri employers and those paid to him by
Kansas employers was 17 to 1.” Id.
102. Id. at 436.
103. Id. at 437-38.
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The Missouri Supreme Court, in evaluating which law to apply, chose to
apply section 145 to the matter.104 In so doing, the court noted that although
the employee resided in Kansas, he worked in Missouri.105 The companies he
worked for used the defendant’s products and were primarily headquartered in
Missouri.106 The court therefore held that the trial court properly applied
Missouri law because the plaintiff’s injuries were intertwined with his
employment.107
In reaching its decision, the Elmore court, departing from the analysis set
forth in Kennedy and Broglin, failed to apply the interest analysis subsections
of section six.108 If the court had applied section six analysis, it would have
found that a true conflict existed.109 Indeed, in Elmore, the worker was a
Kansas resident that came into contact with the harmful product primarily
through his Missouri workplace.110 Under Kansas law, a worker would not
have been able to receive compensation for injuries unless the manufacturer
knew the product was harmful.111 In contrast, under Missouri law, a worker
would have been able to receive compensation because manufacturers are held
to a strict liability standard.112 Thus, the worker’s state of residence, Kansas,
had laws designed to protect the manufacturer, while the worker’s place of
employment, Missouri, had laws designed to reward the plaintiff.113 The
Elmore court held, however, that even though the plaintiff was a Kansas
resident, the laws of Missouri were properly applied because Missouri was
both the place of employment and the place of injury.114
If the Missouri court had employed the interest analysis of Broglin, it
would have been able to examine the interests of all involved jurisdictions.115
As such, the court would probably have determined that Missouri had an
interest in compensating a party that had been injured while being employed
within its state. The result would have been the same, but such a holding
would have been more reasoned and logical.
Courts should follow the analysis of Broglin when examining true conflicts
cases. In Elmore, the application of such analysis would probably not have

104. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 145 (1971); Id. at 437.
105. See Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 437.
106. Id. at 435-36.
107. Id. at 437.
108. See Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 173; Broglin, 510 S.W.2d at 699; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 47, § 145 (1971).
109. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
110. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 435.
111. See Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 436-38.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 437.
115. See generally Broglin, 510 S.W.2d at 699.
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changed the result,116 but in many instances it would. For instance, if a
plaintiff like Elmore is instead a Missouri resident working and injured in
Kansas, a court following Elmore should apply Kansas law and deny
compensation for the Missouri resident. More specifically, a court following
Elmore should apply Kansas law because the plaintiff’s injuries are intertwined
with his place of work in Kansas. Such a holding, however, frustrates
Missouri’s public policy goals of compensating Missouri citizens who have
been injured by defective products. In contrast, a court following the interest
analysis of Broglin could hold that the Missouri resident should receive
compensation because of Missouri’s interest in justly compensating its
residents.
Eight years after Elmore, the Missouri Supreme Court again addressed a
true conflict in Thompson v. Crawford.117 In Thompson, the court once again
failed to apply interest analysis subsections of section six to a true conflict.
Thompson involved the death of a passenger, a Tennessee resident, in an
automobile crash in Tennessee.118 The driver of the vehicle, also from
Tennessee, died in the accident.119 The car was, however, registered, titled,
licensed, and insured in Missouri under the driver’s mother’s name.120 The
passenger’s minor son, who at the time of the accident resided in Tennessee
but later moved to Missouri, filed a wrongful death suit against the driver’s
estate and driver’s mother.121 Under Tennessee law, the action was barred
because Tennessee courts do not toll the statute of limitations for minor
plaintiffs.122 Under Missouri law, however, the plaintiff’s claims were tolled
because the plaintiff did not need to bring the claim until the age of twentyone.123 The Thompson court, in determining which state had the most
significant relationship to the accident, applied section 145 and found:
In the instant case, the negligent conduct of the driver that caused the accident,
as well as the resulting injury, occurred in Tennessee. The decedent, the
negligent driver and the minor plaintiff were residents of Tennessee at the time
of the accident. Applying the above factors to the present case, we conclude
the substantive law of Tennessee governs the plaintiff’s cause of action.
Although the plaintiff now resides in Missouri and the car was registered and

116. See supra notes 100-14 and accompanying text.
117. Thompson v. Crawford, 833 S.W.2d 868 (Mo. 1992).
118. Id. at 869.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Thompson, 833 S.W.2d at 872.
123. See id. The Missouri Supreme Court held in this opinion that it would no longer adhere
to its tolling policy when evaluating foreign tolling statutes. Instead, the court argued that the
better-reasoned rule would be to borrow the statute of limitations of the foreign state as well as
that state’s tolling provisions. Id.
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insured in Missouri, these facts do not create a significant relationship such
that Missouri law should control.124

In reaching this conclusion, the court failed to apply the interest analysis
subsections of section six.125 If the court had, it would have found that a true
conflict existed for the following reasons. First, Missouri had a substantial
interest in allowing a minor child, now domiciled in Missouri, to recover from
a defendant that was domiciled in Missouri and whose car was registered,
titled, and insured in Missouri.126 Tennessee also had an interest in preventing
recovery, however, because the accident victims were domiciled in Tennessee
and the injury occurred in Tennessee.127 Applying the interest analysis of
Broglin, the court could have weighed both interests and determined that
Missouri had a greater interest in compensating the victim since the plaintiff
and defendant resided in Missouri, and the defendant’s car was registered,
licensed, and titled in Missouri.
B.

The Missouri Court of Appeals
1.

False Conflicts

Since Kennedy, all of the recent conflicts cases decided by the Missouri
appellate courts have followed the Second Restatement approach.128 Some
Missouri courts have specifically followed the analytical approach of Kennedy
and have applied section 145 and the interest analysis subsections of section
six.129 For instance, in Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co.,130 the plaintiff brought
a products liability action against a successor corporation for an injury he
alleged was caused by a defective product made by the prior New Jersey
manufacturer.131 Fulton Iron Works, a Delaware corporation which had its
sole place of business in Missouri, purchased most assets of the New Jersey
company and moved all of the purchased assets, including production

124. Id. at 870.
125. See generally Thompson, 833 S.W.2d at 868.
126. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
128. See, e.g., D.L.C. v. Walsh, 908 S.W.2d 791, 794-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Dunaway v.
Fellous, 842 S.W.2d 166, 168-69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992); Nelson v. Hall, 684 S.W.2d 350, 351-52
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Carver v. Schafer, 647 S.W.2d 570, 576 n.6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Huff v.
LaSieur, 571 S.W.2d 654, 655 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Byrn v. American Universal Ins. Co., 548
S.W.2d 186, 188-89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
129. See, e.g., Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Byrn
v. American Universal Insurance, 548 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Griggs v. Riley, 489
S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972).
130. Young, 709 S.W.2d at 927.
131. Id. at 928.
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machinery, to Missouri.132 The plaintiff claimed that the court should apply
the law of New Jersey to the successor corporation even though the company
was incorporated under the laws of Delaware and did business solely in
Missouri.133 Under New Jersey corporate successor law, the successor
corporation could be held strictly liable.134 Under Missouri corporate
successor law, however, the successor corporation could not “be held liable
under the traditional Missouri rule because the threshold requirement of that
rule is that the purchasing corporation acquire all of the assets of the selling
corporation.”135
The Young court painstakingly addressed each factor in section 145 and the
interest analysis subsections of section six.136 As to section 145, the court
found: (a) the injury occurred in Missouri, (b) the conduct causing the injury
occurred in Missouri, (c) the plaintiffs were Missouri residents, but defendant
did business in Missouri and was incorporated in Delaware, and (d) the parties
had no relationship prior to the accident.137
Next, the court addressed the interest analysis subsections of section six.138
The Young court found that Missouri’s interest in applying its own laws was
great because Fulton solely did business in Missouri and Missouri had
specifically adopted a judicial policy with regard to successor liability.139 With
respect to New Jersey’s interest, the court determined that the Missouri
company did not have any ties with New Jersey, and as a result, New Jersey
did not have any interest in having its successor corporation liability laws
applied to a Missouri company.140 Therefore, the Young court held that since
Missouri had a judicially adopted policy with regard to successor liability, and
the successor company had business operations in no other state than Missouri,
Missouri had a greater interest than New Jersey in determining liability of the
Missouri corporate successor.141
In contrast to Young v. Fulton Iron Works Company, a number of Missouri
appellate decisions have cited but not actually followed Kennedy. Instead,
these courts have evaluated conflicts claims only in light of section 145 and

132. See id. at 929-30.
133. Id. at 930-31.
134. Id.
135. Young, 709 S.W.2d at 940.
136. Id. at 936-37.
137. Id. at 936.
138. Id. at 936-37.
139. Id. at 936-37.
140. Young, 709 S.W.2d at 937.
141. Id. at 936. The court also stated that applying Missouri law would protect party
expectations (section 6(d)); promote certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result (section
6(f)); and provide ease in the determination and application of the law (section 6(g)). Id. at 937.
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have failed to apply section six interest analysis.142 For example, in Galvin v.
McGilley Memorial Chapels,143 the plaintiffs brought an action against
McGilley Memorial Chapels for the negligent infliction of emotional distress
for interference with a dead body.144 The plaintiffs, who lived in Kansas,
Iowa, Florida, and Colorado, had made funeral arrangements for the deceased
in Kansas with McGilley Memorial Chapels of Overland Park.145 At the same
time, the plaintiffs signed a contract with McGilley, a Texas corporation that
also operated a chapel in Kansas City, Missouri, for the purchase of funeral
goods and for preparing the body for air transportation from Kansas City,
Missouri to Sioux Falls, South Dakota.146
After the funeral in Kansas, McGilley transported the deceased’s body to
the Kansas City, Missouri chapel for air shipment preparation, and then to
Kansas City International Airport.147 At some time during this period,
however, McGilley misidentified the deceased’s body and sent the wrong body
to Sioux Falls.148 Prior to a visitation period in Sioux Falls, the plaintiffs were
notified that McGilley had sent the wrong body to Sioux Falls.149
Plaintiffs subsequently alleged mental anguish and suffering for
mishandling of the dead body.150 The plaintiffs argued that Missouri law
should apply so that they would not have to prove that McGilley had
intentionally or maliciously, but only negligently, failed to deliver the proper
body.151 In evaluating the plaintiffs’ claim, the Galvin court applied section
145 and determined: (a) the injury occurred in South Dakota; (b) the place of
conduct causing the injury occurred in either Kansas or Missouri; (c) the place
of residency of the decedent was Kansas and the defendant was a Texas
company who had been doing business in Kansas and Missouri; and (d) the
business relationship between the respective parties was established in
Kansas.152 After noting these factors, the Galvin court concluded that the law
of South Dakota, the place of the injury, should govern. Although the bodies

142. See, e.g., Harter v. Ozark-Kenworth, Inc., 904 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995);
Brown v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 803 S.W.2d 610 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); Galvin v. McGilley
Mem. Chapels, 746 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
143. Galvin, 746 S.W.2d at 588.
144. Id. at 589.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 589-90.
148. Galvin, 746 S.W.2d at 589-90.
149. Id. at 590.
150. Id. at 589.
151. Id. at 591-92.
152. See id. at 589-91. The trial court held Kansas law should be applied because under
145(d) the contractual relationship was in Kansas. Galvin, 746 S.W.2d at 590.
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were, in all probability, switched in Missouri, “the distress suffered by the
plaintiffs was a product of the discovery of the mistake in South Dakota.”153
The Galvin court failed to address the interest analysis factors of section
six. If it had, the court may have reasoned that neither the plaintiffs nor the
defendant was from Missouri; therefore, the only interest Missouri had was
that the defendant did business in Missouri and that the bodies were probably
switched in Missouri. To recover in Missouri for the negligent infliction of
emotional distress for interference with a dead body, prior case law had
established that the cause of action only arose upon “sight or knowledge of the
trespass on the body.”154 Because the plaintiffs suffered mental anguish in
South Dakota, the court could have concluded that South Dakota had the
greatest interest in having its laws applied to the plaintiffs’ claim.
It is important that courts consistently apply section six interest analysis to
conflicts claims for several reasons. First, interest analysis is established
precedent under Kennedy.155 Second, interest analysis gives courts an
opportunity to discuss each respective jurisdiction’s interests in the claim.
Third, consistently following interest produces better reasoned opinions, and
establishes a coherent body of precedent. Finally, inconsistent application of
interest analysis may lead to differing results in factually similar cases, thereby
causing further confusion and instability in the application of conflicts laws.156
2.

True Conflicts

Hicks v. Graves Truck Lines Inc. is the only case in which a Missouri
appellate court has addressed a true conflicts issue, but the Hicks court failed to
mention prior Missouri Supreme Court precedent.157 Although the court
recognized that the Missouri Supreme Court had adopted the Second
Restatement in Kennedy v. Dixon, the court distinguished Kennedy as not
involving a true conflict of laws. Therefore, the court reasoned that Kennedy
was not controlling authority within the context of a true conflict.158 Instead,

153. Id. at 591.
154. Id.
155. Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
156. Although an interest analysis in Elmore v. Owens-Illinois would not have produced a
different result, interest analysis in certain circumstances can produce a different outcome than
using a straight section 145 analysis. RESTATEMENT, supra note 47, § 145(1971). See supra
notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
157. Hicks v. Graves Truck Lines, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 439 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). See e.g.,
Broglin v. Nangle, 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1974). See also supra notes 84-96 and accompanying
text (discussing Broglin and application of interest analysis); Kennedy v. Dixon, 439 S.W.2d 173
(Mo. 1969) (en banc) (applying interest analysis).
158. Id.; Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 173.
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the court held that in cases implicating a true conflict, the forum should
generally apply its own law.159
After so holding, the court allowed a Missouri plaintiff to recover against a
Kansas defendant for injuries sustained in an accident in Kansas.160 The court
decided to apply Missouri’s system of comparative fault and ignored a jury
ruling that found that the plaintiff was sixty percent at fault and, therefore,
ineligible to recover under Kansas’ system of comparative fault.161 In so
finding, the court reasoned “that the doctrine of comparative impairment
should be adopted to resolve choice of law cases in which the facts indicate
significant contacts with Missouri and another state under the Restatement 145
test in which both states have legitimate interests in the law choice.”162
The Hicks court failed to evaluate the case in light of Broglin v. Nangle.163
If the court had followed the analysis of Broglin, however, it would have
probably reached the same result. Indeed, the Hicks court applied the section
145 factors to the case and then employed interest analysis. The Hicks court
stated:
The legitimate state interest of Missouri in application of Missouri comparative
fault rule arises from a policy of compensating Missouri residents in the courts
of this state in the manner which this state’s laws have declared. The policy is
particularly applicable where, as here, the Kansas accident location was
fortuitous and unrelated to any other relationship of the parties. The Kansas
state interest, however, must also be recognized. That interest is the
entitlement of Kansas to shield its residents from the effects of torts committed
in the state if the claimant is found to have been the more at fault.164

After so finding, the Hicks court applied forum law because it stated that in
cases involving true conflicts forum law should be applied.165 The Hicks court,
however, would have been better served had it employed Broglin’s interest
analysis. Indeed, following Broglin, the Hicks court would have reached the
same result, but the court would have arrived at it by concluding that Missouri
had a greater interest in the conflict due to Missouri’s long-established policy
of compensating Missouri citizens. Even though the results would be the same

159. Id. (citing Foster v. Leggett, 484 S.W.2d 827 (Ky. App. 1972)). For more on Foster and
true conflicts, see supra note 96.
160. Id. at 444.
161. Id. at 441.
162. Hicks, 707 S.W.2d at 441.
163. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
164. Hicks, 707 S.W.2d at 442-43.
165. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. The Hicks court followed Currie’s first
method for resolving true conflicts. This approach held that courts should adopt forum law when
confronted with true conflicts. In contrast, Broglin followed Currie’s second method for
resolving true conflicts. This approach held that courts should reevaluate their policies when
confronted with a true conflict.
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in Hicks under either analytical approach, such may not occur in all
situations,166 and if differing approaches are applied, a vexing myriad of case
law will emerge in time.
C. Federal Courts
Federal courts sitting in diversity are required to follow the conflicts law of
the state in which they sit.167 Federal courts, much like the appellate courts in
Missouri, have followed the Second Restatement, and in doing so, some
federal courts have only applied section 145168 and others have applied
sections 145 and six.169 Once again, this commentator would encourage
federal courts to apply both section 145 and the interest analysis subsections of
section six to conflicts questions. Such uniform application should not only
prevent wildly divergent results but should also yield a set of coherent
decisions.
In Columbia Petroleum, Inc. v. Waddell, for instance, the federal district
court failed to apply interest analysis to the conflict issues before it.170 In
Waddell, the plaintiff had been injured in Missouri while the conduct causing
the injury had occurred in Kansas.171 Additionally, the court noted that the
defendant’s place of business was in Kansas, although Missouri was the state
in which the agreement was made with the defendant.172
In Waddell, the decision before the court was whether Missouri’s or
Kansas’ statute of limitations should be applied to the action. If Kansas law
applied, the suit would be barred under Missouri’s borrowing statute.173 The
Waddell court concluded that since the agreement and injury both occurred in

166. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text.
167. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
168. See Columbia Petroleum, Inc. v. Waddell, 680 F. Supp. 1348, 1350 (W.D. Mo. 1987);
Ewing v. St. Louis-Clayton Orthopedic Group, 790 F.2d 682, 684 (8th Cir. 1986); Institutional
Food Ass’n, Ltd. v. Golden State Strawberries, Inc., 747 F.2d 448, 454 n.5 (8th Cir. 1986); and
St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill, Lynch, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1054 n.20
(8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978).
169. See Dorman v. Emerson Elec. Co., 23 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir. 1994); Nika Corp. v. City of
Kansas City, 582 F. Supp. 343, 354 n.5 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (citing Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. v.
Waldinger Corp. 508 F. Supp. 390, 394-95 (E.D. Mo. 1981), aff’d in part, modified in part, 666
F.2d 1213 (8th Cir. 1981)); Hansen v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 574 F. Supp. 641, 644 (E.D. Mo.
1983); Daniel Hamm Drayage Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 508 F. Supp. 390, 395, modified on other
grounds, 666 F.2d 1213; and Potter v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 622 F.2d 979, 983 (8th Cir.
1980).
170. Waddell, 680 F. Supp. at 1350.
171. Id. at 1349. The defendant fraudulently prepared oil and gas reports in Kansas and sent
them to the Missouri plaintiff. Id. The Missouri plaintiff suffered damages after relying upon the
fraudulent reports. Id.
172. Id. at 1350.
173. Id.
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Missouri, Missouri statute of limitations period would apply and the suit would
not be barred.174
If the court had applied the interest analysis portion of section six, the
Waddell court may have reached the same result, but would have done so only
after finding that a true conflict existed. In Waddell, Kansas had an interest in
regulating the conduct of the Kansas defendant, and Kansas law would bar the
suit, thereby signifying Kansas’ lack of interest in punishing the defendant, or
in the alternative, rewarding the plaintiff.175 On the other hand, Missouri had
an interest in compensating the plaintiff, and the plaintiff resided in
Missouri.176 Hence, a true conflict existed because Kansas had an interest in
preventing the plaintiff from recovering from the Kansas defendant, and
likewise, Missouri had an interest in compensating the Missouri plaintiff. If
the court had followed Broglin,177 it may have concluded that Missouri had a
greater interest in the conflict due to the fact that the injury occurred in
Missouri and Missouri has a policy of compensating injured Missouri citizens.
IV. CHOICE-OF-LAW, CONTRACTS, AND THE MISSOURI COURTS
A.

Choice-of-Law Clauses and Party Autonomy

The Second Restatement allows contracting parties to stipulate which
state’s laws they want to govern their contract.178 Such provisions will be
upheld unless they violate the public policy of the state which has a materially
greater interest in the transaction, or the state chosen has no substantial
relationship to the parties.179 For instance, in State ex rel. Geil v. Corcoran,180
the plaintiffs had entered into an agreement with Paine, Webber, Jackson and
Curtis, Inc. (“Paine”) for the purchase and sale of securities.181 The agreement
174. Waddell, 680 F. Supp. at 1350.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Broglin, 510 S.W.2d at 699.
178. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF Laws § 186 (1969). The first Missouri court
to follow the Second Restatement was American Institute of Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Brooks,
469 S.W.2d 932, 936 (Mo. App. 1971). In Brooks, the court referred to section 186 and held that
under 186:
Issues in contract are to be determined by the law chosen by the parties in accordance
with the rule of § 187 and otherwise by the law selected in accordance with the rule of s
188. Since the parties have chosen the law of Missouri by their expression of intent in the
contract and by their completion of the contract in Missouri, there is no need to consider
following § 188 to determine by secondary rule that which has already been decided by a
first principle.
Id. at 936.
179. RESTATEMENT SECOND CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 (1961).
180. 623 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
181. Id. at 555.
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stated that New York law would apply.182 The plaintiffs brought suit in
Missouri under Missouri Blue Sky laws for damages arising out of the
purchase and sale of securities from Paine.183
The Geil court refused to enforce the choice-of-law provision because it
was contrary to a fundamental policy of Missouri law.184 The court reasoned
that Missouri had a “very strong policy in favor of providing a judicial forum
for the claims of investors under the blue-sky laws”185 and, therefore, held that
the application of New York law would run counter to Missouri’s statutory
policy of protecting investors in securities transactions.186 Consequently, the
court determined that the arbitration agreement must be voided.187
B.

Choice-of-Law, Contracts, and Section 188

Under the Second Restatement, a court will employ a section 188/6
analysis only if the parties to the contract have not stipulated to the state whose
law shall govern the interpretation of their contractual rights and duties.188
After the Missouri Supreme Court applied the Second Restatement to a tortious
conflicts issue, the question left to the lower courts in Missouri was whether
the Second Restatement was also to be applied to contractual conflicts issues.
In American Institute of Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Brooks,189 a Missouri
appellate court discussed the potential applicability of section 188/6 to
contracts claims.190 In Brooks, the defendant argued that Kennedy v. Dixon
stood for the proposition that the Missouri courts had abandoned the vested
rights approach as a whole.191 Indeed, the Brooks court noted that the Kennedy
court had stated that the adoption of the Second Restatement signaled an end to
182. Id.
183. Id. at 556.
184. Id.
185. Geil, 623 S.W.2d at 556. The statute provides that violation of the state’s blue-sky laws
creates a private cause of action before a state tribunal. Id. Furthermore, the statute states that
“any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive
compliance with any provision of the act . . . is void.” Id.
186. Id. at 557.
187. Id.
188. See, e.g., National Starch and Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978); Nakao v. Nakao, 602 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Bigham v. McCall
Serv. Stations, 637 S.W.2d 227, 231(Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Crown Ctr. Redevelopment Corp. v.
Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of N.C., 716 S.W.2d 348, 357-58 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); and Dillard v.
Shaughnessy, Fickel and Scott Architects, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 711, 715 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
189. 469 S.W.2d at 932-36.
190. Id. at 936. The defendant in the case had argued that the Second Restatement should be
applied to contractual claims in light of Kennedy v. Dixon. Id.
191. Id. The defendant also argued that the Kennedy court intended the Second Restatement
to apply to contractual conflicts claims because the Kennedy court had made reference to a
contractual conflicts claim that had been adjudicated in accordance with the modern conflicts
principles. Id.
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“the harsh and inflexible provisions of the lex loci delicti rule.”192
Nonetheless, the Brooks court determined that it did not need to decide the
potential application of section 188/6 to contractual conflicts claims because
the parties had stipulated to the choice of law they wanted to govern the
case.193
Although the Brooks court did not apply the Second Restatement to
contracts,194 several federal courts applied the Second Restatement to Missouri
conflicts contract claims because these courts readily anticipated that the
Missouri Supreme Court would do so as soon as it addressed the issue.195
Other federal courts, such as the Eight Circuit in Havenfield Corporation v. H
& R Block,196 relied on American Institute of Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Brooks
and held that the Brooks court specifically applied the Second Restatement to
contractual conflicts claims.197 Nonetheless, despite the federal courts
anticipation that the Missouri Supreme Court would adopt the Second
Restatement to conflicts contract claims, the Missouri Supreme court failed to
address the issue until 1980.

192. Brooks, 469 S.W.2d at 936.
193. Id.
194. In Havenfield Corp. v. H. & R. Block, 509 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1975), the Eighth Circuit
claimed that Brooks “held that the contract rules of the Restatement are also to be followed in
Missouri.” Id. at 1267.
195. See Brinkley Co. v. Teledyne Mid-Am. Corp., 333 F. Supp.1183, 1185 (E.D. Mo. 1971);
Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. 359 F. Supp. 271, 284 (W.D. Mo. 1973) (life insurance contract);
and Foam-Tex Indus., Inc. v. Relax-away Corp., 358 F. Supp. 8, 13 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Moss v.
Nat’l Life and Accident Ins. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1291, 1295-96 (W.D. Mo. 1974); Havenfield
Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 509 F. Supp. 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1975); Am. Inst. of Mktg. Sys. v.
Brooks, 469 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) for the proposition that the Second Restatement
applied to contractual situations in Missouri. This case did not reference the federal court
decisions noted supra; Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank v. Bruce, 420 F. Supp. 795, 798 (E.D. Mo. 1976)
(services contract).
Federal courts quite often “anticipate” what a state court might do even though federal
courts are directed to apply the law of the state in which they sit. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 491 (1941). This often leads to development of separate and confusing
precedents. For example, federal courts sitting in Vermont were divided for over thirty years on
whether the Second Restatement or First Restatement applied to contractual and tortious matters.
Gregory E. Smith, Choice of Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1151-53 (1987).
This was primarily because the Vermont Supreme Court has not decided a conflicts issue in thirty
years. Id. When such non-action occurs, many federal courts are all to eager to play the devil’s
advocate and “anticipate” what a state court might do. Indeed, this is what happened in Missouri
because Missouri had not addressed whether the Second Restatement applied to contractual
situations.
196. 509 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1975).
197. Id. at 1267. It should be noted that the Brooks court did not specifically apply section
188 to a contractual claim because the parties had stipulated to the choice of law they wanted to
govern the case. See Brooks, 469 S.W.2d at 936.
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Throughout the 1970s, only one Missouri appellate court, in National
Starch and Chemical Corporation v. Newman,198 addressed the issue, and the
Newman court applied the Second Restatement to a contractual claim.199 In so
holding, the Newman court relied on Kennedy, Brooks, and Havenfield for the
proposition that the Second Restatement “applies in Missouri to both tort and
contract actions.”200
In 1980, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Miller v. Home Insurance Co.,201
was presented with an opportunity to apply section 188 of the Second
Restatement to a dispute over the interpretation of an insurance contract, but
specifically declined to do so.202 With regard to insurance contracts, the Miller
court held that Missouri had consistently adhered to lex loci contractus
analysis in determining what laws to apply to insurance contracts.203
Additionally, the court stated that the Missouri courts had “never adopted the
most significant relationship test for contract cases . . . .”204
After Miller was penned, however, the lower state courts continued to
apply the Second Restatement to contract cases.205 Four years after Miller, the
Missouri Supreme Court once again addressed an insurance contract issue in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. MFA Mutual Insurance Co.206
The State Farm court held that the law of the place where the policies were
issued would govern.207 Significantly, however, the State Farm court neither
addressed whether the lex loci contractus doctrine applied to all contract cases
nor condemned the lower courts use of the Second Restatement.208
Since State Farm, the Missouri Supreme Court has failed to address a
contractual conflicts claim. During this time, the lower courts have continued
to employ the Second Restatement to contractual conflicts claims.209
198. 577 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978). For more on Newman, see infra notes 271-80 and
accompanying text.
199. Id. at 102.
200. Id.
201. 605 S.W.2d at 778.
202. Id. at 780.
203. Id. at 779.
204. Id.
205. See State ex rel Geil v. Corcoran, 623 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Bigham v.
McCall Serv. Stations, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Brown v. Brown, 678
S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
206. 671 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. 1984).
207. Id. at 277 n.2.
208. See Miller, 605 S.W.2d at 780; State Farm, 671 S.W.2d at 277-78. See supra notes 18283 for cases holding that the Second Restatement applied to contractual matters prior to Miller.
See supra note 193 for cases holding that the Second Restatement applied to contractual matters
after Miller but prior to State Farm.
209. See, e.g., Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects, Inc., 943 S.W.2d 711, 715
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Ranch Hand Foods, Inc. v. Polar Pak Foods, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 437, 441
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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In applying the Second Restatement to contractual conflicts claims, some
Missouri appellate courts have only applied section 188 and have failed to
apply the interest analysis subsections of section six.210 For instance, in
Dillard v. Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects,211 the Archbishop of Kansas
City, Kansas hired Huber as the general contractor for the construction of a
church and a school in Leawood, Kansas.212 The Archbishop also hired
Shaughnessy, Fickel & Scott Architects for the construction project.213 The
contract contained an indemnity provision that required Huber to indemnify
the Archdiocese and Shaughnessy “for any claims and expenses, including
attorney’s fees, caused in whole or in part by the negligence of Huber or its
subcontractors.”214
Huber then subcontracted with P/S Masonry of Lenexa, Kansas. The
subcontract contained an indemnity provision requiring P/S Masonry to
indemnify Huber for any expenses resulting from P/S Masonry’s negligence.215
Subsequently, Lee Dillard, an employee of P/S Masonry, was injured when a
masonry wall fell on him.216 Dillard sued Huber, and Huber brought suit

210. See, e.g., Dillard, 943 S.W.2d at 715-16; Ranch Hand Foods, 690 S.W.2d at 440;
Bigham v. McCall Serv. Stations, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 227, 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Nakao v.
Nakao, 602 S.W.2d 223, 226-27 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
Notwithstanding a failure to apply the interest analysis of section 6, Bigham also failed to employ
section 188 to a conflicts contract issue. In Bigham, the plaintiff sued his employer to recover
deductions from his wages made by his employer. Bigham, 637 S.W.2d at 229. The employer
was a Kansas corporation that was licensed to do business in Missouri and had its principle place
of business in Missouri. Id. at 228. The employee, a Missouri resident, worked for the employer
at a Kansas business establishment for 10 weeks in 1971 and worked at various Missouri business
establishments from late-1971 through 1974. Id.
The employee brought suit in Missouri claiming he was entitled to relief under a Kansas statute
which set forth permissible and impermissible deductions an employer could make from his
employee’s wages. Id. at 230. The suit involved wages deducted from the employee’s salary
only after he had been promoted to manager in 1974. Id. at 229.
The Bigham court held that the Kansas statute should not be given extra-territorial effect and
reasoned that this ruling comported with general choice of law principles. Bigham, 637 S.W.2d at
231. The court first asserted that the parties had not stipulated to a choice of law. Therefore, the
court stated that it would apply the laws of the state having the most significant relationship to the
transaction and the parties. Id. Next, the court noted that Missouri had the most contacts with the
parties because the employment was centered in Missouri, the employer had its home office in
Missouri, and the employee filed suit in Missouri. Id.
Additionally, the court acknowledged that “[t]he only contacts connecting the case to Kansas are
quite remote and lack[ed] any real materiality.” Id. at 232. As a result, the Bigham court held that
Missouri law should be applied to the contractual dispute. Id.
211. Dillard, 943 S.W. 2d at 711.
212. Id. at 713.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 713.
216. Dillard, 943 S.W.2d at 713.
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against P/S Masonry seeking indemnification for expenses and attorney’s
fees.217 Huber claimed that Missouri law applied to this issue. However, P/S
Masonry argued that Kansas law applied because Huber would be unable to
receive attorney’s fees under Kansas law.218
In deciding which law to apply, the Dillard court stated that because the
parties had not agreed to a general choice of law provision,219 it would apply
the five factors of section 188. In applying the section 188 factors, the court
found: (a) the place of contracting was in Missouri, (b) the negotiating
occurred in both Missouri and Kansas (c) the place of performance was in
Kansas (d) the subject matter of the contract was in Kansas; and (e) Huber and
P/S Masonry were both incorporated in Missouri, P/S Masonry’s primary place
of business was in Kansas, and Dillard was a resident of Missouri.220
After evaluating these factors, the court decided to apply Kansas law to the
matter.221 The court reasoned that the first factor favored neither state
primarily because P/S Masonry began work forty days before the contract was
signed. Therefore, the court argued that the technical formation of the contract
was of little importance.222 Further, the court asserted that the second factor
did not favor either party, the third and fourth factors favored Kansas, and the
fifth factor slightly favored Missouri.223 In light of these factors, the court
stated that Kansas law would govern,224 and under Kansas law, the author of
the contract has all of the contractual ambiguities, including those regarding

217. Id. Dillard also sued the Archdiocese and the architects. Id. at 713. As to the
Archdiocese, Huber’s insurer indemnified the Archdiocese. Id. The architects also sought
indemnification for attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred. Id. at 714. Huber failed to
indemnify the architects, and the architects brought suit. The appellate court held that Huber had
to indemnify the architects. Dillard, 943 S.W.2d at 714.
218. Id. at 719.
219. Id. at 714 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971)).
The court did note that the contract between Huber and P/S Masonry incorporated
certain portions of the general contract which did contain a choice of law contract indicated that
Kansas law would apply. Id. at 716. Consequently, the court held that any portion of the contact
between Huber and P/S Masonry which incorporated provisions of the general contract by
reference would be interpreted under Kansas law if subjected to litigation. Id.
220. Id. at 716-17.
221. Dillard, 943 S.W.2d at 718.
222. Id. at 716-17.
223. Id. at 718.
224. Id. The court also stated that the contract between Huber and P/S Masonry incorporated
a portion of the contract between Huber and the Archbishop which had stipulated that Kansas law
would govern the contract. Id. at 718. Finally, the court noted, without explanation, that
subsections (d), (e) and (f) of section 6, that is, the principles of certainty, predictability, and
uniformity of result; ease in determination and application of the law to be applied; and the
protection of the justified expectations of the parties - weighed in favor of applying Kansas law.
Id. at 717-18.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

514

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:487

attorney fees, construed against him.225 Therefore, since Huber authored the
contract, the Dillard court concluded that Huber would not be able to collect
attorney’s fees from P/S Masonry.226
In reaching its decision, the Dillard court failed to apply the interest
analysis subsections of section six.227 If the court had applied section 6 interest
analysis, it would have found that a true conflict existed. Indeed, in Dillard,
Huber and P/S Masonry were both Missouri corporations that had signed a
contract in Missouri to perform contractual duties in Kansas.228 Under
Missouri law, Huber would have been able to collect attorney’s fees from P/S
Masonry. In contrast, under Kansas law, Huber would not have been able
collect attorney’s fees. Missouri has a substantial interest in regulating
relations between Missouri corporations. The only interest Kansas has is that
P/S Masonry’s principle place of business was in Kansas and the contractual
duties were to be performed in Kansas.229
If the Missouri court had employed the analysis of Broglin v. Nangle, it
would have been able to reexamine the interests of the involved
jurisdictions.230 As a result, the Dillard court could have determined that
Missouri had a greater interest than Kansas in interpreting a contract between
two Missouri corporations signed in Missouri. Under such a holding, P/S
Masonry would have had to pay Huber’s attorney’s fees.
Unlike Dillard, several Missouri appellate courts have evaluated conflicts
claims in light of section 188 and section six interest analysis.231 For instance,
in Brown v. Brown,232 a mother obtained a decree from a circuit court in St.
Louis in 1979 regarding custody and child support.233 Under the agreement,

225. Id. at 719-20.
226. Dillard, 943 S.W.2d at 719-20.
227. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §6 (1971). The court did discuss
subsections (d), (e), and (f) of section 6. These sections are discussed more often in contractual
claims because courts want to give legal effect to contracts. Dillard, 943 S.W.2d at 716.
228. Dillard, 943 S.W.2d at 712.
229. Id.
230. See supra notes 84-96 and accompanying text.
231. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 678 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); National Starch
and Chemical Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
232. 678 S.W.2d at 831.
233. Id. at 832. Brown relied on Nakao v. Nakao, 602 S.W.2d 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980). In
Nakao, a husband and wife entered into a separation agreement while living in New York. Id. at
224. The husband later moved to Missouri and his former wife remained in New York. Id. at
225. Under the agreement, the husband was required to pay his former wife $600 per month. Id.
at 226. After being laid off from work, the husband sought to have the monthly payments
lowered and brought suit in Missouri. Id. at 225. The court, in determining whether to apply
Missouri law, stated that the five factors of section 188 must be evaluated. Nakao, 602 S.W.2d
at 226-27, (citing National Starch and Chemical Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978).
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the father promised to pay $250 per month for each child, and the parents
agreed that the “Circuit Court of St. Louis County would retain jurisdiction to
change or modify the provisions in the agreement respecting the care, custody,
and support of the minor children.”234 In 1982, the mother filed a motion
seeking to increase the amount of child support.235 Shortly thereafter, the
mother and children moved to North Carolina, while the mother’s ex-husband
had taken up residency in Maryland.236
The father claimed that North Carolina law should be employed in
determining his obligation to pay child support.237 Under North Carolina law
the age of majority is eighteen for all purposes. Since both children were
eighteen or older, the father claimed that his obligations under the Missouri
decree should be terminated.238 On the other hand, the mother urged that
Missouri law should be applied because under Missouri law the father would
be obligated until the child was twenty-one.239
The court then held that the issues at hand should be governed by Missouri law, which
would not allow the court to modify the agreement. Nakao, 602 S.W.2d at 227. If the court had
found that New York law applied, the court could have modified the agreement. Id. at 226. The
Nakao court, however, in determining that Second Restatement factors should be employed, did
not analyze those factors in regard to this case nor did the court engage in section 6 analysis. The
only facts that the court mentioned was that the agreement had been entered into in New York,
the decree was enforceable in Missouri, and the husband was a resident of Missouri. If the court
had properly applied interest analysis subsections of section 6, New York law should have
governed.
This case presents a classic unprovided-for-case. See supra note 39. In this situation,
the policy of neither state would be advanced by the application of its law. Indeed, in Nakao, the
husband, a resident of Missouri, wanted to avail himself of New York law so that the decree can
be changed. The wife, a resident of New York, wanted to avail herself of Missouri law so that the
decree would not be changed. See id. at 226.
To resolve this dispute Currie’s interest analysis approach would recommend the forum
apply its own law. See supra note 36. However, this author would advocate that before applying
forum law, the court should attempt to reevaluate each state’s interests to determine if one
jurisdiction has a greater interest in having its laws applied to the issue. Such an analysis could
follow the analysis used by Broglin v. Nangle. Indeed, following the Broglin analysis, the Nakao
court could have found that New York had a substantial interest in having its own laws applied to
a separation agreement that had been entered into in its state. Furthermore, the court could have
also noted that one of the parties to the agreement still resided in New York. Finally, the court
could have found that the only interest Missouri had in the matter was that one of the parties to
the agreement had fortuitously taken up residency in Missouri. Therefore, the Nakao court could
have applied the laws of New York.
234. Brown, 678 S.W.2d at 833.
235. Id. The mother stated that her former husband had enjoyed a substantial increase in
salary, and that she needed the additional funds to help support the oldest child who was in
college. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Brown, 678 S.W.2d at 833.
239. Id.
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In determining whether Missouri or North Carolina law applied, the Brown
court first applied the five factors set out in section 188.240 In applying the
section 188 factors, the court found: (a) that the contract was entered into in
Missouri; (b) that the place of negotiation was uncertain because the father had
resided in Florida at the time the agreement was reached; (c) that the place of
performance occurred when the father sent a check to the Circuit Court; (d)
that the subject matter of the contract, the children, had been residing in
Missouri, but now reside in North Carolina; and (e) that the father was
domiciled in Maryland, and the mother and children in North Carolina.241
After evaluating these findings, the court determined that the only significant
contact Missouri possessed was “in preserving the integrity of a Missouri
decree in a Missouri court.”242
As such, the court next applied section six interest analysis. In so doing,
the court decided that Missouri possessed a strong interest in protecting
children that resided within their borders, but since none of the parties resided
in Missouri, North Carolina law should be applied.243 However, “[a]ccording
to North Carolina law, the validity and construction of a contract, including
separation agreements, is determined by the law of the state where it is
executed.”244 Since the separation agreement was entered into in Missouri, the
court found that Missouri law should be applied to the case. Therefore, the
father was bound to pay child support under the agreement.245
C. Choice of Law, Contracts, and Presumptive Provisions
If the contractual dispute falls within one of the presumptive provisions,
then the Restatement provides detailed rules for how to handle that dispute.246
The Restatement furnishes rules for specific types of contracts247 and for
specific contract issues.248 However, even where the Restatement sets forth a
presumption concerning a specific issue, it maintains the most significant
relationship test in reserve.249 The interplay between these sections is

240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Brown, 678 S.W.2d at 833.
244. Id. at 834.
245. Id. at 832.
246. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
247. The Restatement provides for specific rules with regard to land contracts, sale of
chattels, insurance contracts, contracts of surety, contracts for repayment of money lent,
transportation contracts, and usurious contracts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW
§§ 189-198.
248. The Restatement provides for specific rules with regard to capacity, contractual
formalities, consideration, fraud, duress, mistake, assignment, and discharge. Id. §§ 199-212.
249. See infra notes 249-55 and accompanying text.
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articulated very well by the Missouri appellate court’s decision in National
Starch & Chemical Corporation v. Newman.250
In Newman, the defendant worked for a New York company as a sales
agent for industrial adhesives.251 The defendant first signed an agreement with
the plaintiff when he serviced the Mid-Atlantic states, and later, he signed a
second agreement when servicing the Southeastern states.252 Under the
agreements, if the defendant left his employment he could not compete with
the plaintiff for two years.253 The defendant was subsequently promoted and
assigned to service the Midwest in Kansas City, Missouri.254 When the
defendant was transferred he did not sign another contract with the plaintiff.255
Several years later, the plaintiff was conducting an audit and realized that a
number of employees in sensitive positions had access to trade secrets.256
Thereafter, the company sought to have the defendant and others sign a new
trade protection agreement.257 Newman refused to sign the new agreement,
formed his own partnership in Kansas City, Missouri, and began competing
against his former employer.258 His former employer then brought suit against
the defendant for breach of the agreement that the defendant had signed when
working in Atlanta, Georgia.259
The Newman court first evaluated section 196.260 Under section 196, a
court is instructed to apply the law of the state where the major portions of the
contract services are to be performed unless another state has more significant
contacts.261 In evaluating section 196, the court found that comment A stated
that section 196 applied only if services or a major portion of the services were
performed in one state.262 Here, however, the defendant serviced a number of
states throughout the Southeast; therefore, the Newman court found that section
196 did not apply.263

250. 577 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979).
251. Id. at 101.
252. Id.
253. Id. Restrictive agreements arise quite often. See Ranch Hand Foods, 690 S.W.2d at
439-40; Nooter, 687 S.W.2d at 696.
254. Newman, 577 S.W.2d at 101.
255. Id. at 102.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Newman, 577 S.W.2d at 102.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §196 (1971).
261. Newman, 577 S.W.2d at 103. For an example of another case discussing service
contracts, see generally Citizens & Southern Nat’l Bank v. Bruce, 420 F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Mo.
1976).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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Next, the Newman court utilized sections 188 and six to determine whether
the law of Missouri, Georgia, or New York should be applied to the contractual
dispute. Under Missouri law, the restrictive covenant would be enforced while
under Georgia and New York law the covenant would not be enforced.264 In
applying section 188, the Newman court found: (a) that the place of contract
may have been in Georgia where the employee resided or in New York where
the employer conducted its business; (b) that the place of negotiation was
unknown; (c) that the place of performance was in the southeastern states in
which he operated; (d) that the location of the subject matter of the contract
was in the southeastern states; and (e) that the defendant resided in Atlanta at
the time the agreement was signed and that he currently lives in Kansas City,
Missouri while the plaintiff’s principle place of business is in New York.265
After evaluating these factors, the court attempted to assess the interests of the
involved states.266
The Newman court found that Missouri’s interest in applying its laws was
great because the defendant currently resides in Missouri and is operating a
business in Missouri which is directly competing against the plaintiff’s
Missouri businesses.267 Additionally, the court noted that Missouri laws
encourage the enforcement of reasonably restrictive covenants if they protect
Missouri businesses from unfair competition by former employees.268 On the
other hand, the court found that “[t]he relative interest of Georgia and New
York [wa]s slight, if existent at all; the competition in question bears no
relation to Georgia or New York.”269 Consequently, the Newman court applied
Missouri law to the dispute, and upheld the restrictive covenant agreement.270
Unlike National Starch and Chemical Corporation v. Newman, a number
of Missouri appellate decisions have not specifically followed the exact
provisions set forth by the Second Restatement.271 For instance, in Ranch
Hand Foods v. Polar Pak Foods, Inc.,272 a Kansas employee signed an
agreement with his Kansas employer which contained a restrictive covenant.273
The Kansas employer’s company was incorporated in Missouri.274 The Kansas
employee left the company and began competing against it.275 Thereafter, the
264. Id. at 103-04.
265. Id. at 104.
266. Newman, 577 S.W.2d at 104.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 104-05.
271. See Ranch Hand Foods v. Polar Pak Foods, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
272. 690 S.W.2d 437 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
273. Id. at 441.
274. Id.
275. Id.
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company brought suit in Missouri seeking to have its two-year restrictive
covenant enforced.276
The Ranch Hand Foods court next had to determine whether to apply
Kansas or Missouri law to the contractual issue. The court, following
Newman, applied the five factors of section 188 and concluded that the
contacts weighed heavily in favor of applying Kansas law. Specifically, the
court found:
The Ranch Hand place of business was in Kansas, Lumianski was a Kansas
resident and the services were to be performed in Kansas. Although no direct
evidence on the subject was presented, there is no reasonable ground to infer
that the contract was signed in Kansas. The only factors associated with
Missouri were Ranch Hand’s incorporation in Missouri, use of a Missouri
lawyer to draw up the contract and the fact that Missouri customers were
diverted by appellants from Ranch Hand to Polar Pak.277

The Ranch Hand Foods court also noted that section 196 was relevant
because that section “directs the local law of the state where the major portions
of the contract services are performed will determine contract validity in
conflicting relationship situations.”278 Applying section 196, the court decided
that the main services were to be performed in Kansas; therefore, the court
held that Kansas law should be applied to determine whether the restrictive
covenant should be enforced.279
Unfortunately, the analysis employed by the Ranch Hand Foods court did
not follow the exact procedures set forth by the Second Restatement.280 Under

276. Id.
277. Ranch Hand Foods, 690 S.W.2d at 441.
278. Id. at 440 n.2.
279. Id.
280. Other Missouri courts have also failed to follow the exact procedures set forth by the
Second Restatement. For example, in Nooter Corp. v. Todd, 687 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985), a Pennsylvania employee signed an agreement with his Pennsylvania employer which
contained a restrictive covenant. Id. at 696. The restrictive covenant prevented him from
working for any of his employer’s competitors whom operated east of the Rocky Mountains for
three years after leaving employment with said employer. Id. The employee left his job and
began working for a competitor that was incorporated in Missouri with offices in Illinois. Id.
The Pennsylvania employer then brought suit in Missouri seeking to have its restrictive covenant
enforced. Id. at 695.
In deciding whether to apply Missouri law or Pennsylvania law, the Nooter court
recognized that under section 188 “[i]f the place of negotiating the contract and the place of
performance are in the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied.” Id. at 696.
The court stated that the contract was signed, negotiated, and performed in Pennsylvania and,
therefore, following section 188 held that Pennsylvania law should be applied. Id.
In so finding, the Nooter court failed to apply section 196. Section 196 directs a court to
apply the law of the state where the major portions of contract services are to be performed,
which in Nooter would be Pennsylvania. Id. The Nooter court attained the same result by
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the Second Restatement, a court should first employ section 196, and then, if
needed, utilize sections 188 and six.281 If the Ranch Hand Foods court had
correctly employed the analysis of Newman, it would have properly followed
the tenets of the Second Restatement. The end result would have been the
same, but such a holding would have been better reasoned and logical.
D. Choice of Law, Insurance Contracts, and Presumptive Provisions
Under the First Restatement, insurance contracts are interpreted according
to the place where the agreement had been made.282 By contrast, the Second
Restatement provided that insurance contacts are to be interpreted according to
several specific presumptive provisions. The presumptive provisions of the
Second Restatement state: that life insurance contracts are almost always
construed according to the law of the insured’s domicile;283 that casualty
insurance contracts are almost always construed according to the principal
location of the insured risk;284 and that liability insurance contracts are
governed by the law applicable to tort liability, but compliance with
contractual terms are governed by general choice of law principles.285
The federal courts in Missouri were the first courts to embrace the Second
Restatement position with regards to insurance conflicts.286 For instance, in
Nelson v. Aetna Life Insurance Co.,287 the federal court determined that
Missouri followed the Second Restatement with regards to insurance
contracts.288 The Aetna court did so only after holding that Kennedy v.
Dixon289 signaled the “deliberate rejection of the discredited vested rights
doctrine.”290
Under section 192 of the Second Restatement, the validity of a life
insurance contract is decided by the local law of the state where the insured
was domiciled at the time he applied for the policy.291 In Nelson, the company
that issued the policy had been doing business in Missouri and the insured had
applying section 188; nevertheless, if the court had properly followed the Second Restatement, it
would have applied section 196 to the issue at hand.
281. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 196 (1971).
282. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934).
283. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 192 (1971).
284. Id. §193.
285. Id. § 194.
286. See Nelson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 359 F. Supp. 271 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Foam-Tex
Industries Inc. v. Relaxaway Corporation, 358 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Moss v. National Life
and Accident Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Mo. 1974). Of these three cases, Nelson is the
most often cited.
287. 359 F. Supp. 271, 284 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
288. Id. at 284-96.
289. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969).
290. Id. at 286.
291. Id. at 290-91.
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been domiciled at all times in Missouri.292 The insurance company claimed
that the policy had been delivered to his employer in Tulsa, Oklahoma, and
that the policy contained a provision stating that the policy should be construed
according to the laws of the jurisdiction where it was delivered.293
The insurance company sought to have Oklahoma law applied because
under Oklahoma law it would not have to pay benefits to the beneficiary of the
The
policy because the beneficiary’s death resulted from suicide.294
beneficiary claimed that the insured was insane at the time he committed
suicide and argued that Missouri law should be applied because the insured
had been domiciled in Missouri when he applied for the life insurance
policy.295 Under Missouri law, “in all suits upon life insurance policies issued
by any company doing business in Missouri to a citizen of Missouri ‘it shall be
no defense that the insured committed suicide, unless it shall be shown to the
satisfaction of the court or jury trying the cause, that the insured contemplated
suicide at the time he made his application for the policy, and any stipulation in
the policy to the contrary shall be void.’”296 The Nelson court, following the
Second Restatement, agreed with the beneficiary and applied Missouri law.297
Federal courts continued to apply the Second Restatement to insurance
contracts throughout the 1970s. Then in 1980, the Missouri Supreme Court
finally addressed whether Missouri followed the Second Restatement with
regard to insurance contracts. In Miller v. Home Insurance Co.,298 a widow
was attempting to collect a $50,000 death benefit as designated beneficiary of
an insurance policy issued by the Home Insurance Company to her husband’s
long time employer.299 The decedent had resided in Alabama and died, by
suicide, in Alabama.300 He had worked as the Southeastern Regional Sales
Manager for A.P. Green Refractories Company (“A.P. Green”).301 A.P. Green
was headquartered in Mexico, Missouri “and it is undisputed that the policy
was issued and apparently delivered to the company as the group policyholder
at its home office in Mexico.”302 The policy excluded from coverage
“‘intentionally self-inflicted injuries suicide or any attempt threat, while sane
or insane (in Missouri, while sane.).’”303 Under Alabama law, suicide

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id. at 273, 290, 296.
Id. at 273.
Kennedy, 439 S.W.2d at 274.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id. at 296.
605 S.W.2d 778 (Mo. 1980).
Id. at 779.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Miller, 605 S.W.2d at 779.
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exclusions were valid; however, under Missouri law the court would have to
decide whether suicide while sane fell within the meanings of the issued
policy.304
In determining which law to employ, the Missouri Supreme Court stated
that it had consistently adhered to the lex loci contractus analysis in
determining which law to apply to contracts of insurance.305 The court
specifically rejected employing significant contacts analysis of the Second
Restatement.306 Applying the law of the First Restatement, the court held that
Missouri law controls because that was where the master policy was
delivered.307 The court then concluded that under Missouri law suicide while
sane was not a covered risk within the group insurance policy at issue.308
The very next year, in Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. United States Fidelity
and Guaranty Co.,309 a federal district court held that Missouri courts employ
the Second Restatement for resolving choice of law issues in insurance
contract cases.310 Several years later, the Missouri Supreme Court once again
addressed whether it applied the First or Second Restatement to insurance
contracts in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. MFA Mutual
Insurance Co.311
In State Farm, a Missouri resident was a passenger in a vehicle being
driven by another Missouri resident.312 The passenger and driver were both
injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist in Illinois.313 The passenger
had MFA insurance and the driver had State Farm insurance.314 Each of the
policies contained uninsured motorist coverage in the amount of $10,000 as
was required by Missouri law at that time.315 State Farm settled with the
passenger and brought suit against MFA seeking a declaration that MFA,

304. Id.
305. Id. (citing Whited v. National Western Life Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 364, 368 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975); Bearup v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 172 S.W.2d 942, 946 (1943); Fields v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 118 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938); Lukens v.
International Life Ins. Co., 191 S.W. 418, 419 (1917), appeal dismissed 248 U.S. 596 (1919)).
306. Id. at 780.
307. Id.
308. Miller, 605 S.W.2d at 780. But cf. Buck v. American States Life Ins. Co., 723 F. Supp
155, 158 n.1 (E.D. Mo 1989) (the federal court limits Miller’s holding to group insurance
contracts); Baxter Int’l, Inc. v. American States Ins. Co., 976 F.2d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding the 8th Circuit will apply the Restatement in contract cases).
309. 527 F. Supp. 666 (E.D. Mo. 1981).
310. Id. at 670-71 (citing Havenfield Corp. v. H. & R. Block, 509 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1975).
311. 671 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. 1984). Cf. Brown v. Home Ins. Co., 176 F.3d 1102, 1107-08 (8th
Cir. 1999).
312. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d at 277.
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id.
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under Missouri case law, was required to contribute two-thirds of the
settlement.316 MFA claimed that Illinois law should apply because “the
accident occurred in Illinois, the uninsured motorist resided in Illinois, and the
uninsured vehicle was registered in Illinois.”317 The Missouri court held that
Missouri law should apply and the court reasoned:
Missouri law, rather than Illinois law, clearly applies. The respondent, MFA,
argues that the more “significant contacts” are found in Illinois. Even if this
analysis is appropriate, however, the question is not so much one of the
number of contacts but rather of their relative significance. This case involves
contractual provisions mandated by Missouri statute. The public policy
underlying the statute is strong.318

This explanation seems to lack clarity, but the court clearly did not apply the
Second Restatement, thereby seemingly validating Miller.
In Perkins v. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co.,319 the court evaluated
whether an insurer had to pay the beneficiary of the life insurance policy after
the insured committed suicide.320 In so deciding, the Perkins court stated that
Missouri utilizes lex loci contractus analysis when determining which law
applies in insurance contract suits.321 Hence, the court concluded that since the
policy was executed in Missouri and the insured was a resident of Missouri
that the insured’s alleged suicide was no defense to payment under state
statute.322
Even in light of Miller, State Farm and Perkins, Missouri appellate courts
have continued to apply the Second Restatement to insurance contract conflicts
issues.323 The first Missouri appellate court to do so hold was Crown Center

316. Id. (citing Midwest Mutual Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 565 S.W.2d 711 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978).
317. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 671 S.W.2d at 277.
318. Id. (citation omitted).
319. 586 F. Supp. 296 (W.D. Mo. 1984), aff’d, 755 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1984).
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. The Missouri state statute addressing this is section 376.620 of the Missouri Revised
Statutes. Section 376.620 provides:
In all suits upon policies of insurance on life hereafter issued by any company doing
business in this state, to a citizen of this state, it shall be no defense that the insured
committed suicide . . . and any stipulation in the policy to the contrary shall be void.
R.S.MO. § 376.620.
323. See, e.g., Crown Center Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Cas. Co. of North
Carolina, 716 S.W.2d 348, 357(Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Protective Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cook, 734
S.W.2d 898, 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Frost v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 828 S.W.2d 915, 920 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1992); Hartzler v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 881 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. Ct. App.
1994). For federal courts applying the Second Restatement to insurance contracts, see, e.g.,
United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 653 F. Supp. 152, 177-78 (W.D. Mo. 1986); Davidson
& Schaaff, Inc. v. Liberty Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 69 F.3d 868, 869 (8th Cir. 1995).
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Redevelopment Corp. v. Occidental Fire & Casualty Co. of North Carolina.324
In this case, Crown Center, a wholly owned subsidiary of Hallmark, entered
into an agreement with Hyatt Corporation for the construction of a hotel.325
The agreement provided that Crown Center would design, construct, and
finance the hotel on property owned by it while Hyatt would manage the hotel
upon its completion in exchange for a share of the hotel’s gross receipts.326
Pursuant to the agreement, Crown Center was to maintain comprehensive
general liability insurance on the hotel from its opening date and continuing for
thirty years.327 Crown Center obtained a line of insurance with various
insurance agencies.328 Hallmark, Crown Center, and Hyatt were covered under
the various insurance policies.329
In 1981, two elevated skywalls in the lobby of the Hyatt Regency Hotel
collapsed, and over 100 people were killed and over 200 others injured.330
Numerous claims were subsequently filed against Hallmark, Crown Center,
and Hyatt, and these companies notified their insurers.331 Two of the insurance
companies argued that Illinois law, not Missouri law, should be applied
because Hyatt and one of the insurance companies were Illinois companies and
the contract was made in Illinois.332
The Crown Center court, in addressing this argument, first stated that the
parties did not stipulate whose laws would apply and, therefore, found that
sections six, 188, and 193 of the Second Restatement should be applied to the
insurance contract conflicts issue. In so finding, the court noted that courts in
Missouri have followed the Second Restatement in contracts conflicts
actions,333 and, therefore, held that “[i]f section 188 is not adopted by
324. 716 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). This decision was handed down in July of 1986.
In United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 653 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Mo. 1986), the federal
district court held that Missouri courts followed the Second Restatement with respect to insurance
contracts. Id. at 175. The Conservation Chemical Co. court completely ignored Miller, State
Farm, and Perkins. Instead, to support its proposition, the court cited to Havenfield v. H. & R.
Block, 509 F.2d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1975); Ryder Truck Rental v. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 527 F.
Supp. 666, 670-71 (E.D. Mo. 1981); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1986); Starch & Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577 S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978);
Conservation Chemical, 653 F. Supp. at 175.
325. Crown Center, 716 S.W.2d at 350.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 350-51.
329. Id.
330. Crown Center, 716 S.W.2d at 352.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 357-58.
333. Id. at 358 (citing Brown v. Brown, 678 S.W.2d 831, 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (“Missouri
employs the criteria found in section 188”). Nakao v. Nakao, 602 S.W. 2d 223, 226 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980) (“Missouri uses the criteria found in section 188”); Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block,
Inc., 509 F.2d 1263, 1267 (8th Cir. 1975); National Starch and Chem. Corp. v. Newman, 577
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implication, this court now adopts sections 188 and 193 of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS in casualty insurance cases.”334 Next, the
Crown Center court, applying section 193, stated that a court must apply the
law of the location of the insured risk.335 In this case, the location of the
insured risk was the Kansas City Hyatt Regency located in Missouri.336
Therefore, the Crown Center court concluded that Missouri law should be
applied.337
Numerous other courts have followed Crown Center and have applied the
Second Restatement to insurance contract conflicts issues.338 For instance, in
Hartzler v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company,339 the plaintiff, a
Kansas resident, contracted in Missouri to insure a vehicle that was registered
and garaged in Kansas.340 The contract included an anti-stacking provision.341
The plaintiff was later involved in an accident with a negligent Kansas
driver.342 When the plaintiff filed a claim under her policy’s uninsured
motorist provision, the insurer deducted sums already paid by negligent
driver’s insurance company; and therefore, the Kansas resident was not fully
compensated.343
The Kansas resident subsequently claimed that she could stack her policy’s
uninsured motorist coverage with another American Family uninsured motorist
policy that the plaintiff carried on another vehicle.344 If Missouri law was
applied, the plaintiff could recover;345 however, if Kansas law was applied, the
plaintiff could not recover due to Kansas’ anti-stacking provision.346
Following the Second Restatement, the Hartzler court concluded that Kansas
law would control because it was the principle location of the insured risk; and,
as a result, the plaintiff lost.347
S.W.2d 99, 102 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Am. Inst. of Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Brooks, 469 S.W.2d 932,
936 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971)).
334. Id. The Crown Center court failed to mention Miller or State Farm.
335. Crown Center, 716 S.W.2d at 358-59 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 193 cmt. b (1971)). The court also noted that comment f to section 193 of the Second
Restatement on Conflicts provides that when an insured is covered in numerous states the
Restatement would treat each insured risk separately and would apply the law of the state where
the risk is located. Id.
336. Id. at 359.
337. Id.
338. See supra note 310.
339. 881 S.W.2d 653 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
340. Id. at 654.
341. Id. at 654 n.1.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Hartzler, 881 S.W.2d at 654 n.1.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Id. at 656.
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Missouri appellate courts and federal courts sitting in diversity in Missouri,
save one, have consistently applied the Second Restatement to insurance
contract conflicts. The Missouri Supreme Court failed to apply the Second
Restatement to insurance contract conflicts in the early 1980s, and the court
has since declined to address the issue. This commentator encourages
Missouri courts to continue applying the Second Restatement to insurance
contract conflicts because the First Restatement is not flexible enough to
accommodate the practical realities of modern commercial business
enterprises. Indeed, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Kennedy v. Dixon,
recognized that the First Restatement’s tort conflicts rules were not flexible
enough to accommodate the mobility of modern society, and it is hoped that
the court will soon recognize that the First Restatement’s insurance contract
rules are not flexible enough to accommodate modern business practices.
V. CONCLUSION
Missouri courts, while declaring that they adhere to the Second
Restatement in tortious and contractual conflicts cases, have failed to fully
follow its dictates. When courts do not adhere to established tests, their
decisions create precedent that is seemingly illogical and unwieldy. In today’s
legal world, this lack of coherent precedent heightens the probability that an
unpredictable result might ensue when litigating a conflicts issue. It is
imperative that courts adhere to a set of well- documented tests, and if such
occurs, predictability of result will follow. Without predictability, a lawyer’s
ability to plan strategically for litigation will be impaired. Moreover, the cost
and time of litigation will substantially increase.348 This article advocates that
Missouri courts should follow the dictates of the Second Restatement where
possible and established precedent where not.
When applying the Second Restatement to tortious issues, Missouri courts
should follow the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Dixon,349
and apply section 145 and the interest analysis subsections of section six.350 It
is important that Missouri courts apply the interest analysis subsections of
section six because it gives courts an opportunity to apply the law of the
jurisdiction that has the greatest interest in the conflict. If, when employing
interest analysis, a court finds that a true conflict exists, Missouri courts should
follow the Missouri Supreme Court’s decision in Broglin v. Nangle351 and
348. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 16-17 (1984) (discussing how certainty of outcome can decrease the costs of
litigation); Larry Ribstein, Choosing Law by Contract, 18 J. CORP. L. 245, 253-54 (1992)
(arguing that uncertainty about choice-of-law increases costs and frequency of litigation and may
increase a party’s gains from litigating rather than settling).
349. 439 S.W.2d 173 (Mo. 1969) (en banc).
350. Id. at 180-81, 184.
351. 510 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. 1974) (en banc).
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reevaluate the conflict to determine whose laws should be applied. In
reevaluating the laws, courts are once again given the opportunity to apply the
laws of the jurisdiction that has the greatest interest in the conflict.
When applying the Second Restatement to contractual issues, Missouri
courts should uphold contracting parties choice of forum provisions unless the
forum chosen has no substantial relationship to the parties or unless the
designation is contrary to the public policy of a jurisdiction which has a
materially greater interest in the transaction. Then, if a presumptive measure
of the Restatement is implicated, the court should follow the rules set forth by
the Restatement unless another state has a substantially greater interest. In
determining whether another state has a substantially greater interest, Missouri
courts should employ section 188 and the interest analysis subsections of
section six. Finally, if the contract does not fall within one the courts
presumptive measures, then a court should apply section 188 and the interest
analysis subsections of section six. The application of interest analysis for
conflicts should follow Kennedy and for true conflicts should follow Broglin.
Such application should allow courts the room to evaluate each state’s
respective policies and should give them the opportunity to apply the law of
the jurisdiction that has the greatest interest in the conflict.
If Missouri courts follow these rules, there will be a higher level of
uniformity, consistency, and certainty in conflicts cases. This will create the
sound and logical precedent that is tantamount to establishing predictability in
conflicts. In Missouri, at least, if the courts follow these guidelines, judges
should be able to develop a set of decisions which are discernible and
reflective of a core set of conflicts principles. As a result, judges will
gradually become less apprehensive when confronted with conflicts issues, and
lawyers will have to spend less time and money confronting conflicts issues.
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